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Abstract:
Conventional accounts of justice suppose the presence of a stable political society, stable
identities, and a Westphalian cartography of clear lines of authority--usually a state--where
justice can be realised.  They also assume a stable social bond.  But what if, in an age of
globalisation, the territorial boundaries of politics unbundle and a stable social bond deteriorates?
How then are we to think about justice?  Can there be justice in a world where that bond is
constantly being disrupted or transformed by globalisation?   Thus the paper argues that we need
to think about the relationship between globalisation, governance and justice.  It does so in three
stages: (i) It explains how, under conditions of globalisation, assumptions made about the social
bond are changing.  (ii) It demonsrates how strains on the social bond within states give rise to a
search for newer forms of global political theory and organisation and the emergence of new
global (non state) actors which contest with states over the policy agendas emanating from
globalisation.  (iii) Despite the new forms of activity identified at (ii) the paper concludes that the
prospects for a satisfactory synthesis of a liberal economic theory of globalisation, a normative
political theory of the global public domain and a new social bond are remote.
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2'The political problem of mankind is to combine these things: economic
efficiency, social justice and individual liberty.'  John Maynard Keynes noted in
Essays in Persuasion (1931)
Globalisation has become the most over used and under specified term in the international
policy sciences since the passing of the Cold War.  It is a term that is not going to go away.
More recently globalisation has come to be associated with financial collapse and economic
turmoil and our ability to satisfy Keynes’ three requirements under conditions of globalisation
are as remote now as at the time he was writing.  Neither markets nor the extant structures of
governance appear capable of providing for all three conditions at once.  Globalisation has
improved economic efficiency and it has provided enhanced individual liberty for many; but in
its failure to ensure social justice on a global scale, it also inhibits liberty for many more.
Even leading globalisers--proponents of continued global economic liberalisation occupying
positions of influence in either the public or private domain--now concede that in the failure to
deliver a more just global economic order, globalisation may hold within it the seeds of its own
demise.  As James Wolfenson, President of the World Bank, noted '...[i]f we do not have
greater equity and social justice, there will be no political stability and without political
stability no amount of money put together in financial packages will give us financial stability'.1
His words, even if they appear to invert justice and stability as 'means' and 'ends', are a sign of
the times in the international financial institutions.
Conventional accounts of justice suppose the presence of a stable political society, community
or state as the site where justice can be instituted or realised.  Moreover, conventional
accounts, whether domestic or global, have also assumed a We tphalian cartography of clear
lines and stable identities and a settled, stable social bond.  In so doing conventional theories--
essentially liberal individualist theory (and indeed liberal democracy more generally)--have
limited our ability to think about political action beyond the territorial state.  But what if the
territorial boundaries of politics are coming unbundle and a stable social bond deteriorates?
3Must a conception of justice relinquish its Westphalian coordinates?  These are not merely
questions for the political philosopher.  In a time when the very fabric of the social bond is
constantly being re-woven by globalisation, they cast massive policy shadows.
There are no settled social bonds in an age of globalisation; the Westphalian 'givens' of justice
no longer pertain.  The forces and pressures of modernity and globalisation, as time and space
compress, render the idea of a stable social bond improbable.  If this is the case, how are we to
think about justice?   When the social bond is undergoing change or modification as a
consequence of globalising pressures how can justice be conceptualised, let alone realised?
Can there be justice in a world where that bond is constantly being disrupted, renegotiated and
transformed by globalisation?  What are the distributive responsibilities under conditions of
globalisation, if any, of states?  What should be the role of the international institutions in
influencing the redistribution of wealth and resources on a global scale?
These are serious normative questions about governance.  In the absence of institutions of
governance capable of addressing these questions, justice (no matter how loosely defined) is
unlikely to prevail.  This paper suggests we need to begin to think about the relationship
between globalisation, governance and justice.  To-date, the question of 'justice'--a central
question of academic political philosophy as practised within the context of the bounded
sovereignty of the nation state--is underdeveloped as a subject of study under conditions of
globalisation.  Similarly, the study of globalisation--especially when understood as economic
liberalisation and integration on a global scale--has been equally blind to 'justice' questions.
This should come as no surprise.  The struggle to separate normative and analytical enterprises
has long been common practice in the social sciences.  Indeed, it has been for a long time the
hallmark of 'appropriate' scholarly endeavour.  But such is the impact of globalisation that we
need to consider how we can traverse this artificial divide.  Nowhere is this more important
than at the interface of the processes of globalisation and our understanding of what constitutes
the prospects for creating a just international order at the end of the second millennium.
4The paper is in three sections.  Section one looks at the changing role of the state under
conditions of globalisation.  It explains how assumptions made about the social bond--almost
exclusively conceived in terms of sovereignty--are changing.  It considers the specific
challenges to the embedded liberal compromise that did so much to solidify the social bond in
welfare states in the post world war two era.  Section two charts the rise of some new global
(non state) actors, that are now contesting with states over the policy agendas emanating from
globalisation.  The argument is twofold.  Firstly, strain on the social bond within states is
giving rise to a search for newer forms of organisation that transcend the sovereign state.  We
thus need to rethink how we understand the public domain on a global, as opposed to a
national, level.  Secondly, limited and flawed as the activities of non state actors (especially
NGOS and Global Social Movements) may be in the global public domain, they represent an
important, evolving, alternative voice in the discourse of globalisation to that of the semi
official neo-liberal orthodoxy on globalisation.  Moreover, the voice of the NGO and the
Global Social Movement is the one serious voice that aspires, rhetorically at least, to the
development of a 'justice-based' dialogue beyond the level of the sovereign state.
Section three draws the strands of the first two sections together.  It suggests that we have an
analytical deficit occasioned by the failure of economic liberalism to assess the threat to its
legitimacy emanating from its theoretical and practical myopia towards the politic l and
cultural dynamics at work under globalisation--the key sources of resistance to economic
globalisation.  Neo-liberalism, with its emphasis on global commercialisation, has forgetten
why societal and democratic governmental structures were developed over the centuries
Thus the Conclusion to the paper exhorts us to remember that states have important practical
assets and normative theoretical roles.  They are not mere passive actors in the face of
globalisation and justice, difficult as it would be even if we could conceive of structures of
global governance that might deliver it, will prove even more elusive in the absence of such
political structures under conditions of economic globalisation.  The prospects of a
satisfactory synthesis of the imperatives of a liberal economic theory of globalisation, a
5normative political theory of the global sphere and a new form of social bond to compensate
for the decline of the social bond within the contours of the sovereign state are deemed to be
slight.
Sovereignty and Modern Political Life
The sovereign state is the primary subject of modern international relations.  Indeed, it has
been the exclusive legitimate subject of international relations in the Westphalian system; the
highest point of decision and authority.  Since the middle of the seventeenth century the
sovereign form of state has become hegemonic by a process of eliminating alternative forms of
governance.2   The modern state achieved a particular resolution of the social bond hinged on
the idea that political life is, or ought to be, governed according to the principle of
sovereignty.  The concept of sovereignty concentrated social, economic and political life
around a single site of governance.
This conception of politics dates back to the legitimation crisis of the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries.  Thomas Hobbes saw the political purpose of the sovereign state as the
establishment of order based on mutual relations of protection and obedience.3  The sovereign
acted as the provider of security and the citizen inturn offered allegiance and obedience.  This
account emphasised sovereignty as the centre of authority, the origin of law and the source of
individual and collective security.  Citizens were bound together, whether for reasons of
liberty or security, by their subjection to a common ruler and a common law.  This basic
structure of governance forged a social bond among citizens and between citizens and the
state.
The institution of state sovereignty brought with it a spatial resolution which distinguished
between the domesticated interior and the anarchical exterior.  In general terms, inside and
outside came to stand for a series of binary oppositions that defined the limits of political
possibility.4  Inside came to embody the possibility of peace, order, security and justice;
6outside, the absence of what is achieved internally: war, anarchy, insecurity and injustice.
Where sovereignty is present governance is possible; where it is absent governance is
precluded.  Modern political life is predicated on an exclusionary political space ruled by a
single, supreme centre of decision-making claiming to represent and govern a political
community.  In recent interpretations sovereignty has been understood as a constitutive
political practice, one which has the effect of defining the social bond in terms of unity,
exclusivity and boundedness and by the state’s monopolisation of authority, territory and
community.5
A further crucial function performed by the sovereign state, of particular concern to this paper,
has been the management of the national economy.  Historically there have been competing
accounts of how states should govern their economies, especially over the manner and extent
to which governments should intervene in and regulate economic activity.  Yet historically,
and despite many important ideological and normative differences, there has been a tendency
within the dominant liberal tradition to treat national economies as discrete systems of social
organisation more or less delimited by the state’s territorial boundaries.  Economies are
conceived as largely self-contained, self-regulating systems of exchange and production.  This
was as true for economic liberals such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo as it was for
economic nationalists and mercantilists such as List and Hamilton.  This is not to suggest that
such thinkers were blind to the fact that economic activity commonly spilled over national
frontiers, but that they treated national economies as self-contained units in the international
market.
The economy served the community of the state in which it was embedded; its functions and
benefits were defined via the interests of a given political society.  That states monopolised the
right to tax within their boundaries enhanced the correlation of the economy with the state’s
boundaries.  One of the general functions of the state therefore was to govern the economy in
such a way as to promote the wealth and welfare of the community.  Liberals focused on the
market mechanism as the surest and most efficient means of ensuring the liberty, security and
7prosperity of both individuals and the community; non-liberal approaches tended to emphasise
the need for regulation and manipulation of economic activity in order to satisfy the social
needs of the community.
In short, a purpose of the sovereign state in modern political life was to stabilise the social
bond.  It did so by resolving questions of governance around the principle of sovereignty.
Structures and practices of governance were established with direct correspondence between
authority, territory, community and economy.  It is in this context that justice has
conventionally been conceived.  Justice, no matter how defined, depended on a settled, stable
social bond.  Outside of a settled social bond justice was thought to be unlikely if not
impossible.  The sovereign state was thus a precondition for justice.  However it is defined--
whether as security from injury, as most natural law thinkers understood it, or as the
distribution of rights and duties as liberals tend to define it--justice has generally been
circumscribed by the territorial limits of the sovereign state.  The boundaries of justice were
thought to be coextensive with the legal-territorial jurisdiction and economic reach of the
sovereign polity.
But that was then.  The sovereign state is an historical product that emerged in a particular
time to resolve social, economic and political problems.  With the passage of time, and the
changed milieux in which states exist, it is no longer axiomatic that the sovereign state is
practical or adequate as a means of comprehensively organising modern political life and
especially providing the array of public goods normally associated with the late twentieth
century welfare state.  In the following section we survey the manner in which some of the
trends associated with economic globalisation have begun to unravel the distinctive resolution
of the social bond achieved by the sovereign state, and in particular the welfare state.
Increasingly, the sovereign state is seen as out-of-kilter with the times as globalisation
radically transforms time-space relations and alters the traditional coordinates of social and
political life.
Globalisation and Embedded Liberalism
8Material changes associated with economic globalisation--especially the processes of
liberalisation, deregulation and integration of the global economy in the domains of
production, exchange and finance--are affecting the ability of the sovereign state to stabilise
the social bond.  Even if we reject the more extreme post modern readings of sovereignty
under globalisation, several normative questions are raised by this destabilisation.  As the
coordinates of modern social and political life alter, states--the traditional Westphalian site of
authority--are supplemented, outflanked and sometimes overrun by competing sources of
authority.  Alternative sources of power and authority arising from globalisation place
pressure on the capacity of the state to deliver welfare provisions and, in turn, transforms the
social bond.
To be specific, the urge for free markets and small government has created asymmetries in the
relationship between the global economy and the national state that has undermined the post-
WWII embedded liberal compromise.6  According to John Ruggie, the liberal international
order was predicated on measures taken concurrently to ensure domestic order and to
domesticate the international economy.7  C nsequently, the modern welfare state was the
product of both domestic and international forces.  States were the sites of trade-off, charged
with cushioning domestic society against external pressures and transnational forces. But,
globalisation has changed this and one as yet unexplored implication of Ruggie’s early analysis
is that it focuses attention on a reconfiguration of the social bond as a result of changes
emanating from the processes of adjustment in the division of political space between the
domestic and international policy domains.  Domestic and international politics became
embedded and intertwined in the same global system--the post-WWII liberal order.
States are thus crucial in shaping the social bonds which exist at any given time and in any
given space.  They alter the relationship not just between insiders and outsiders, but between
citizens and the state.  However, as domestic and foreign economic policy issues become
increasingly blurred, as the domestic economy becomes increasingly detached from the
9sovereign state, and as economic de-regulation and de-nationalisation continue, it is more
difficult for states to manage the domestic-international trade-off in a way that satisfies
competing demands on it.  It becomes more difficult for states to sustain the trade-offs
managed in the Bretton Woods, embeded liberal, ra.
Globalisation makes it harder for governments to provide the compensatory mechanisms that
could underwrite social cohesion in the face of change in employment structures.   As it has
become more difficult to tax capital, the burden shifts labour making it more difficult to run
welfare states.8  Policy makers may be wising up to this problem but a felt need to avoid
socially disintegrative activities has not been joined by a clear policy understanding of how to
minimise dislocation in the face of the tensions inherent in the structural imperatives of
economic liberalisation and where economic compensation alone may not be sufficient.  In the
closing days of the twentieth century, the internationalisation of trade and finance may be
sound economic theory, but it is also contentious political practice.  When pursued in
combination, free markets and the reduction of, or failure to introduce, compensatory
domestic welfare is a potent cocktail leading to radical responses from the dispossessed.9
An economist's response to this dilemma--that liberalisation enhances aggregate welfare--
might well be correct, but it does not solve the p itical problem.  It might be good economic
theory but it is poor political theory.  Whiles some objections to liberalisation are indeed
'protectionism' by another name, not all objections can be categorised in this manner.
Moreover, even where compensatory mechanisms might be adequate, the destruction of
domestic social arrangements can have deleterious outcomes of their own.  If nationalist
responses are to be avoided then public policy must distinguish between protectionism and
legitimate concerns.  Securing domestic political support for the continued liberalisation of the
global economy requires more than just the assertion of its economic virtue.  It also requires
political legitimation.
10
Thus the question facing political theorists and policy analysts alike is can the embedded liberal
compromise (maximising the positive and mitigating the negative effects of international
liberalisation) be maintained, or repaired even?  This is now a much wider question than when
first formulated by Ruggie.  Under conditions of globalisation, the question must now be
addressed not only within, but also beyond the boundaries of the state.  Sovereignty as the
organising principle of international relations is undergoing a more dramatic rethink than at
any time since its inception. In an era of globalisation--accompanied by assumptions about the
reduced effectiveness of states--policy makers and analysts set greater store by the need to
enhance the problem solving capabilities of various international regimes in the resolution of
conflict and the institutionalisation of cooperation.  But the contours of this rethink are still
primarily linked to enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of international regimes.
The language of globalisation, especially in its neo-liberal guise, is about the managerialist
capacity of the modern state.  But it has failed to recognise the manner in which the
internationalisation of governance can also exacerbate the 'democratic deficit.'  States are not
only problem solvers, their policy elites are also strategic actors with interests of, and for,
themselves. Collective action problem solving in international relations is couched in terms of
effective governance.  It is rarely posed as a question of responsible or accountable
government, let alone justice  While these latter questions may be the big normative questions
of political theory; it is the political theory of the bounded sovereign state.  For most of the
world's population, the extant institutions of global governance--especially the financial ones--
are not seen to deliver justice.
Questions of global redistributive justice, accountability and democracy receive scant attention
from within the mainstream of political philosophy and a political theory of global governance
is in its infancy.  Extant political theories of justice and representative governance assume the
presence of sovereignty.  In an era of a fraying social bond at the state level and the absence of
alternative focuses of identity at the global level, the prospects of securing systems of
efficiency, let alone accountability seem slim.  For realist scholars and practitioners of
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international relations this is unsurprising.  They assume the absence of altruism.  Force and
power--not global dialogue about the prospects for community and democracy, pacethe work
of the cosmopolitan political theorists such as Linklater and Held10--are the driving forces of
international relations.
Yet there is a paradox.  The language of democracy and justice takes on a more important
rhetorical role in a global context at the same time as globalisation attenuates the hold of
democratic communities over the policy making process within the territorial state.  As the
nation state as a vehicle for democratic engagement becomes problematic, the clamour for
democratic engagement at the global level becomes stronger.  But these are not stable
processes.  Attention to the importance of normative questions of governance and state
practice as exercises in accountability, democratic enhancement and what we might call
justice-generation, must catch up with our understanding of governance as exercises in
effectiveness and efficiency.  There are a number of ways to do this.  One route, explored in
section two, is to extend the public policy discourse on the nature of market-state relations to
include other actors from civil society.
Global Governance and the Transformation of the Public Sphere
The modern social bond was conceived in terms of the concentration of authority, territory
and community around the notion of sovereignty.  Moreover, this political resolution was
intimately tied to a notion of a corresponding economic space.  But for a hundred and thirty
years or--since the marginalist revolution--economic analysis has become separated from the
study of politics and society.  It is only with a recognition of globalisation that civil society,
along with the market and the state has become an increasingly significant third leg of an
analytical triangle without which our ability to reconstruct, or create, social solidarity, trust
and political legitimacy is limited.11  There is still a reluctance in much of the policy
community to recognise the manner in which markets are socio-political constructions whose
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functioning (and legitimacy) depends on them possessing wide and deep support within civil
society.
If sovereignty bestowed upon modern political life an organisational form premised on
boundedness and exclusion, globalisation is unpacking this form of organisation.  Under
globalisation--especially with the emergence of a new international division of labour
underwritten by the increased, indeed largely unrestrainable, mobility of capital and
technology--our understanding of political and economic space has changed.  This section
examines transformations in the public sphere brought about by the emergence of new actors
under globalisation, especially the increasing role NGOs, the rise of multilateralism and an
emerging emphasis on civil society in an interwoven triangular relationship with the state and
the market.  But if non-state actors are now influential agents of change in a number of key
policy areas of international relations, we are less sure of the degree to which this influence is
'unscripted' or if it represents a coherent process of expanded international diplomacy
'appropriate' to globalisation.
The public sphere, at least in its Kantian sense, is where ‘private’ individuals come together as
free and equal participants in an informed discussion of matters affecting the common welfare
of the community.  Its emergence as a critical reaction to the bs lu ist state in the eighteenth
century was driven by a sense that society could and should press its demands upon the
abstract, impersonal, modern state.  The public sphere functions as a zone where civil society
can engage with and scrutinise the state’s exercise of power and authority.12  I  performing
the important legitimation function within the modern state, the public sphere is integral to th
formation and transformation of the social bond.  For a public sphere to be genuinely open it
must be inclusive: any citizen who stands to be affected by decisions reached in discussion
must be allowed to bring their perspective to bear and freely express their viewpoint.
Normally, the public sphere has been confined to individual states.  Today, with the arrival of
electronic communication technologies and other means by which time and space compress, it
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is possible to conceive of a transnational or global public sphere; that is, a public sphere which
interacts and functions on the plane of global social relations.  We survey below some of the
ways in which the interaction between states and non-state actors now finds expression in the
global sphere
Transforming the Global Public Sphere? Civil Society and NGOs
Theoretically, one of the functions performed by non-state actors is to hold states and inter-
governmental organisations to account.  In much the same way that domestic civil society
expresses itself via the public sphere, new social movements and NGOs are attempting to
voice their concerns in a global public sphere.  While remaining outside the official realm of
the institutions of states and international organisations they seek to establish the interests and
rights of those generally excluded from discussion.
As embryonic as this global public sphere may be, it is possible to see the contours of an
evolving arena where social movements, non-state actors and ‘global citizens’ join with states
and international organisations in a dialogue over the exercise of power and authority across
the globe.  The emergence of the global public sphere, albeit partial, impacts on the social
bond by modifying the citizen’s relationship to her own state, to citizens of other states, and to
international organisations.  The development of a global public sphere loosens the social bond
traditionally defined by the sovereign state.
Global civil society has come to represent a domain that traverses the boundaries of the
sovereign state, albeit in a range of contested ways.  For some, global civil society is a but a
substitute for revolution forgone.  It is merely the domain of the new managerial class.  The
habitat of 'Davos Man'.  For others it can be the source from which a more just society might
develop in an era when disillusionment with the ability of traditional forms of politics to deliver
justice has never been higher.  But is it legitimate to develop the concept of civil society
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beyond its origins in nineteenth century European political thought?  Is it permissible to
extrapolate from civil to global civil society?  We think so.
In contrast to its earlier correspondence with the bourgeoisie under the development of
capitalism, Robert Cox calls a 'bottom up' understanding of civil society in which:
'[C]ivil society is the realm in which those who are disadvantaged by globalisation of
the world economy can mount their protests and seek alternatives. ... More ambitious
still is the vision of a 'global civil society' in which these social movements together
constitute a basis for an alternative world order.  In a 'top down' sense ... states and
corporate interests ... [would make it] ... an agency for stabilizing the social and
political status quo ... and thus enhance the legitimacy of the prevailing order'.13
In such a theoretical formulation, NGOs, GSMs and other kinds of trans national associations
become the principal actors in the reconstruction of political authority at the global level.
Transnational associations bring together politically, culturally and territorially diverse
organisations and individuals to advance a common agenda on one or another issue of global
import.  In empirical terms, the growth of NGOs has been dramatic.  The number of
international NGOs (defined as operating in more than three countries) was estimated to be in
excess of 20, 000 by 1994;14  NGOs can facilitate cross national policy transfer and modify
policy processes; trans-national networks of NGOs are vehicles to empower domestic NGOs
on a range of issue at the global level.
But increasingly prominent as they may be, it remains to be seen whether  NGOs and GSMs
are agents for building a post-Westphalian global civil society and reconstructing a new
social bond at the end of the twentieth century.  The behaviour of NGOs is invariably
normative, prescriptive, increasingly internationalised, highly politicised and at times very
effective.15  NGOs try to universalise a given value and their growing influence is
revolutionising the relationship between ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of multilateralism.  The old
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multilateralism is constituted by the top down activities of the existing structures of
international institutional governance (IMF, World Bank and WTO).  The new
multilateralism represents the attempt by social movements to 'building a system of global
governance from the bottom up’16
The preferred strategy of the old multilateralism of the international institutions is to extend
their remit geographically (wider institutional membership), functionally (deeper coverage of
issues) and inclusively (by the cooption and socialisation of recalcitrant actors into the
dominant neo-liberal market mode.)  By contrast, the new multilateralism of the GSMs
(especially NGOs in developing countries) tries to change prevailing organising assumptions of
the contemporary global order and thus alter policy outcomes.  While multilateralism is not
imperialism, a working assumption of many NGOs is that many existing institutions are
instruments if not of US hegemony, then at least of an OECD ideological dominance of the
existing world economic order.
Whatever their agendas the ability of social movements to affect decision making in
international fora rubs up against the processes of globalisation.   Throughout the 1990s,
social movement resistance to 'free trade' related issues has invariably been characterised as
protectionist or globophobic.  This is certainly the case with the environmental movement,
where demands for sustainable development imply a form of 'fettered development' to counter
the deregulating tendencies of globalisation.  It is also the case in the domain of human rights,
where NGOs attempt to strengthen labour rights generally (women’s and children’s rights in
particular) in the face of MNCs location decisions based on factors such as cheap labour costs.
Much current NGO activity can be captured under a broad, if ill-defined agenda to secure
'justice for those disadvantaged by globalisation'.
NGOs articulate a view of globalisation--emphasising privatisation, deregulation and market
conforming adjustment--as antithetical to their aims of securing human rights and
environmental protection.  NGOs represent alternative discourses to those reflected in the
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positions of those who gain most from the advance of globalisation.  Opposition to
globalisation has become an integrating feature of much of the literature of 'internationalised'
NGOs.17  Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the opposition to NAFTA in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, in resistance to the agendas of the WTO and the OECD initiative on a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment in late 1990s.  This interest in how to alter (resist)
globalisation represents a shift in the modus operandi of NGOs--from the field to the corridors
of power.  In many policy domains they have become the discursive opposition.
Traditional agents--such as the established policy communities holding office in the major
industrial countries and the inter-governmental financial institutions--are only just beginning to
recognise the significance of NGOs and GSMs.  At times, established actors appear to lack the
skills to deal in anything other than a resistive or combative fashion with these groups.  But
governments are learning that they must secure their support or, at the very least, neutralise
their opposition.  But the ability to secure a balance between wider consultation and
accountability on the one hand and an ability to resist the pressures of lobby groups on the
other is still underdeveloped.  Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the ambiguity of the
international economic institutions towards interaction with bodies purporting to be acting on
behalf of one or another group within 'civil society'.  This is certainly the case at the IMF,
WTO and, albeit to a lesser extent, at the World Bank.  There is now quite a long history of
engaging NGOs on the ground in developing countries at the World Bank.  Extending this
engagement to the decision making processes in Washington is still largely resisted.
In short, the elite driven nature of the neo-liberal globalisation project is under challenge.  The
internationalisation of NGOs, enhanced by new technologies, allows them to address
governmental policy from outside, as well as from within, the state.  They represent, or at least
purport to represent, interests that are conventionally excluded from decision-making processes.
As such, they are vehicles for the advancement of strong normative ideas in global civil society.
NGOs and other similar, mission-driven, agents are a  inc asingly important actors in
contemporary international politics and governance.  Securing a peaceful and constructive
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modus operandi with non-state actors will be a major exercise for state actors in the global
policy community in the twenty-first century.
The Rise and Rise of the NGO: Keeping a Sense of Perspective
Some NGOs are now global agents or players of some influence, as the 1997 award of the
Nobel Peace Prize for the campaign to ban landmines and the role of NGOs in the defeat of
the MAI attests.18  NGOs are clearly capable of setting agendas and changing international
policy on important issues.  But, the age of innocence is over.   NGOs are in many ways the
victims of their own success.  Longer standing actors in international relations--state and
intergovernmental organisation policy making elites--now treating them much more seriously.
At present there is a discrepancy between the demands of NGOs for rights (to be heard and to
influence policy) and an acceptance of certain obligations or duties that may be attendant on
these rights (especially the duty truthfully to reflect the position of one’s antagonists.)  While a
balance may come with time, to-date only minimal efforts to inculcate a 'rights-duties' balance
within the larger NGO families have been made.19  If NGOs and other non state actors are to
become legitimate agents of acceptable structures of global governance in an era of
globalisation they will have to accept the need for transparent, accountable and participatory
systems of decision-making of exactly the kind they expect to see in national governments,
multinational corporations and international organisations.
Speaking the language of 'opposition', their discourse reflects a greater commitment to
questions of justice, accountability and democracy.  But there are limits to the degree of
support and acceptance their agendas are likely to secure.  For example, despite the economic
crisis that began in East Asia, the power of the free market ideal remains strong and support
for interference in the interests of redistributive justice are unlikely to replace the market ideal
in the corridors of public power and private wealth.  Moreover, not all opponents of the worst
effects of globalisation are necessarily protectionists or opponents of economic liberalisation
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per se.  Educated populations are capable of disaggregating the various elements of
liberalisation.  Survey data suggets they are more supportive of trade liberalisation than they
are of financial deregulation.20  Much social movement interest in the 'new protectionism'--a
return to 'localisation'--is an over simplified rhetorical position that lacks the intellectual power
to counter the logic of liberalisation.
Globalisation, Justice and the State
That the activity and influence of NGOs has increased in international relations, is in little
doubt.  It is however, naive to universalise the NGO experience.  States still propose and
dispose of international agreements and NGOs still--as in their involvement in the activities of
the international institutions--need governmental sponsorship, or at least governmental
acquiescence, to secure influence.
Polarisation, social disintegration and the re-emergence (often violent) of identity politics are
visible outcomes of the inequalities between globalisation's winners and losers.  They raises
several questions that will become increasingly important if we are to create a more just world
order.  Will we have: (i) enough food for growing populations? (ii) enough energy for growing
economies? (iii) a sustainable physical environment which to inhabit? (iv) glo al institutions to
manage these issues, preserve the peace, prevent burgeoning civic unrest and political-military
dislocation within the developing world and in relations between the developed and the
developing worlds?
Economists tell us that the key elements of globalisation--the greater economic integration of
the international economy and the revolution in communications and technology--are, of
themselves, neutral and have the potential to solve these problems.  In theory maybe, but it is
not axiomatic that the tension between economic growth and environmental sustainability will
be contained.  Making the world’s population more secure depends on how this tension is
managed.  This is the governance question.  Governance--the means by which societies deliver
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collective goods and minimise collective bads--is as important today as it ever was and states
remain central to this process.  But, there is a deficit in the relationship between the de facto
market led processes of economic liberalisation and integration and the de jure state g nerated
mechanisms that underwrite the international fora for the delivery of collective goods.
Thus the efficacy of the major international institutions remains a key normative and policy
question for the twenty-first century.  Will they remain vehicles for the pursuit of state
interests, as traditionally defined in realist understandings of international organisation?  Or,
can they evolve into sites to accommodate multiple demands and interests of public and
private and state and non-state actors throughout the widening policy communities and civil
societies of states?  These are normative and analytical questions, yet they cast long policy
shadows.  The contest between the ‘multilateralism from above’ and the ‘multilateralism from
below’ is just beginning
State policy elites may be conscious of their own diminished sovereignty but also of the
accompanying need to control the ‘public bads’ that emanate from the effects of technology
on cultures and eco-systems and the international order; especially the spread of drugs, crime,
terrorism, disease and pollution.  For sovereignty erosion to be acceptable, it must occur via
collective action in an issue-specific, not generalised, manner.  'Sovereignty pooling' will have
to be volunteered out of a recognition that self interest is sometimes advanced collectively not
individually.
How likely is this when the major factor explaining inter-state cooperation is still domestic
actor preferences?21  Despite impeccable normative arguments in favour of collective action
problem solving, prospects for regular successful international cooperation amongst states
must not be exaggerated.  The desired basic goods for a 'just' global era--economic regulation,
environmental security, the containment of organised crime and terrorism, and the
enhancement of welfare--will not be provided on a state by state basis.  They must be provided
collectively.
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If the limitations of inter-state cooperation are to be overcome, greater use will have to be
made of innovative approaches to governance arising from the information revolution.
Technology can strengthen the governance capacities of both state and civil society.
Information technologies offer opportunities for private sector supplementation of the
governance functions of states.  Public/private provision of collective goods must not be seen
as an either/or policy option.  Private sector actors, from both the corporate world and civil
society, will continue to be more significant in inter-governmental negotiation processes as
issue-linked coalitions operate across borders to set agendas and enforce compliance.
In addition to the ‘how’ question in the international institutional management of those global
forces that have a major impact on societies, this paper has also asked the important normative
question.  What are the prospects for supra national institutional forms of regulation that
guarantee some kind of fairness?  Justice in a global context we have tried to suggest is an
underdeveloped, but emerging issue.  The normative agenda for international relations will not
go away.  But for justice to have meaning in an era of globalisation, governance will have to
be exercised at a global level.  As yet, however, the institutions of global governance are il -
equipped to cope with such issues.
Moreover, we live in a culture of moral hazard in which, to provide but the most obvious
example, the speculative operation of the international capital markets are under written by the
sacrifices of ordinary members of society, especially in the developing world.  The era of
instant global capital mobility is seen by many of the world’s population, and not just in the
developing world, as a time of heightened and permanent insecurity.  There may be movement
in the international financial institutions, but unless something is done to mitigate the prospects
of events such as the East Asia currency crises re-occurring, the lesson the majority of the
world’s population will draw is that even a reformed system, let alone the system as it is
currently constituted, will be unable to deliver anything approaching an acceptably just or
equitable world order.
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In this respect, economic liberalisation holds within it the seeds of its own downfall.
Intellectual and evidentiary arguments for liberalisation and open markets as superior
generators of wealth have been won; or should have been.  But rapid aggregate increases in
global wealth and production have been accompanied by a corresponding naivety as to the
political and social effects of these processes on the civil polities of developed and developing
societies alike.  As the politics of the East Asia crises demonstrated, theoretical parsimony
blinds modern liberal economic theory and current market practices to the complex and
combative politics that constitutes the down side of economic liberalisation.  Sound rationalist
economic logic of its own is not sufficient to contain the backlash against globalisation.22
Conclusion
For many in the developed world, liberalisation has become an end in itself with little or no
consideration given to its effect on prevailing social norms and values within societies and
polities.  Consequently, the consensus over how society is organised within the spatial
jurisdiction of nation-states is strained and the continued process of liberalisation is threatened.
Globalisation is unravelling the social bond.  The policy remedies for maintaining the cohesion
of communities at the disposal of state agents are curtailed, although not eliminated.  Some
governments attempt to 'depoliticise'--that is place at one step remove--the state's
responsibility for the effects of globalisation on its citizenry.  Yet it is the practice of politics
that creates the structures of communities.23  As such, it will make the role of state institutions
much more important in the next decade than has been assumed throughout the neo-liberal era
when the retreat of the state was deemed axiomatic.24  States have assets and capabilities, they
are not merely passive or reactive actors.
But these assets have to be used better, domestically and internationally, if economic
liberalisation is to allow for the more effective provision of public goods.  How to strike the
appropriate balance between domestic socio-political imperatives and a normative
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commitment to an open liberal economic order remains the central policy question for the next
century.  Globalisation is clearly an issue in need of sophisticated tec nical  conomic analysis,
but it is also in need of analysis that is normative and ethical.  First best, economically efficient,
solutions may not always be politically feasible, or indeed socially desirable and most
economic analysis has to-date studiously ignored those socio-political and cultural conditions
that, often more than economic explanation, will condition the prospects of continued
liberalisation.
Following from this analytical and theoretical deficit, the practical question facing policy
makers in the early twenty-first century will be how to develop appropriate international
institutions; and 'appropriate' does not mean simply 'effective'. Attempts to implement
collective policies through the international institutions will lack legitimacy if there is no
shared normative commitment to the virtue of a given policy.  International institutions must
secure converging policy positions by agreement and willing harmonisation, not by force.
There must be provision, where necessary, for political communities to exercise an exit option
on a particular issue where it is thought that this issue threatens the fibre of their (national)
identity.  This is not to offer a free riders charter in the contemporary global economy, but to
call for tolerance and an acceptance of difference rarely displayed under a neo-liberal
orthodoxy in the closing stages of the twentieth century.25 Without such tolerance the
prospects for the development of some kind of social bond conducive to a the development of
a minimum conception of global justice cannot be envisaged.
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